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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







   
v. 
 
FAST RIG SUPPORT, LLC; 
 FIRST AMERICANS SHIPPING AND TRUCKING, INC., 
  Appellants 
______________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 3-13-cv-02844) 
District Judge: Hon. Malachy E. Mannion 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 20, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and SHWARTZ, Circuit 
Judges.  
 
(Filed: May 23, 2016) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Trucking companies Fast Rig Support, LLC and First 
Americans Shipping and Trucking, Inc., (collectively, 
“Defendants”), appeal the stipulated judgment requiring them 
to pay Plaintiffs overtime.  Because the District Court 
correctly determined that Defendants have not met their 
burden to show that the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) 
exemption to the overtime provisions in the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) and Pennsylvania Minimum Wage 
Act (“PMWA”) applies, see 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); 43 Pa. 




 Plaintiffs, including Alphonse Mazzarella, worked for 
Defendants as truck drivers. They transported water to 
hydraulic fracking sites within Pennsylvania.1  Mazzarella 
asserts that he and his coworkers often worked more than 
forty hours in a week, but were  paid overtime only for work 
performed above forty-five hours per week, in violation of the 
overtime provisions of the FLSA and PMWA.2   
 
 Before trial was scheduled to begin, the District Court 
ordered the parties to submit briefing on whether the 
Defendants were subject to the MCA exemption to the 
FLSA’s overtime requirements.  As explained infra, the MCA 
provides that certain interstate employment activity that is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation 
is exempt from certain requirements, such as the FLSA’s 
overtime provisions. 
 
 In support of applying the MCA, Defendants explained 
that they contract with gas-drilling companies to transport 
water from “retention ponds” to drill sites for hydraulic 
fracking.  Defendants assert that after fracking is completed, 
                                              
1 Although Defendants assert that “[i]n many 
instances, the drivers do leave the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania during the ordinary course of their 
employment,” App. II at 15, they do not deny that their 
drivers’ primary responsibilities involved the transportation 
of water within Pennsylvania itself, and as discussed further 
herein, provide no evidence to substantiate the claim that the 
drivers leave Pennsylvania as part of their duties. 
2 The parties stipulated to the conditional certification 
of a collective FLSA action, and Plaintiffs withdrew their 
class action claims under the PMWA.  
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they are occasionally hired to transport the water used in the 
fracking process to injection wells for disposal.  Although 
Defendants presented detailed arguments about the fracking 
process in their briefs, they submitted no evidence on this 
topic.  Rather, Defendants submitted only: (1) a certificate 
issued by the Department of Transportation authorizing 
Defendant First Americans to “engage in transportation as a 
common carrier of property . . . in interstate or foreign 
commerce,” App. II at 50; (2) a news article about another 
company in Pennsylvania and regulatory decisions being 
made about the fracking industry; and (3) a one-page 
spreadsheet which appears to record water shipments over a 
three-day period in January 2013.   
 
 The District Court held that the water Defendants 
transported constituted property for purposes of applying the 
MCA, but that Defendants had not shown the water and 
drivers were engaged in a “continuous stream of interstate 
travel.”  App. I at 16-17.  The District Court noted that its 
own research disclosed that water involved in the fracking 
process becomes “contaminated,” App. I at 18, and 
“substantially modified,” and thus Defendants were engaged 
in “two separate commercial transactions,” one before the 
water becomes “tainted” and one after the fracking process is 
complete, leading to the conclusion that there was no 
continuous movement of an unaltered item across state lines 
and “insufficient evidence of interstate intent” on Defendants’ 
part to apply the MCA exemption, App. I at 20-21.   
 
 The parties agreed to the entry of a conditional 
judgment awarding Plaintiffs $31,000, which allowed 
Defendants to appeal the ruling precluding them from relying 
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  The FLSA generally mandates that employers pay 
employees 150% of their hourly wage for all time worked 
above forty hours per week.5  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).  Several 
                                              
3 Defendants’ notice of appeal seeks review of “the 
final judgment entered in this action.”  App. I at 1.  However, 
based upon the arguments presented in the parties’ briefs and 
the contents of the stipulated judgment, we understand the 
parties are seeking review of the District Court’s order that 
held the MCA exemption did not apply. 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ 
FLSA claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and the PMWA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 
and we have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  The question of “[w]hether an employee’s 
particular activities excluded them from the overtime benefits 
of the FLSA is a question of law.”  Resch v. Krapf’s Coaches, 
Inc., 785 F.3d 869, 872 n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Icicle 
Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986)).  
Accordingly, we exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s legal conclusions.  See Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. 
Co., 691 F.3d 500, 514-15 (3d Cir. 2012); Kosiba v. Merck & 
Co., 384 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2004).  
5 This analysis applies equally to the FLSA and 
PMWA claims, given the similarities between the MCA in 
each statute.  See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (FLSA exemption); 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 333.105(b)(7) (PMWA exemption); 
see also Resch, 785 F.3d at 871 n.4 (noting that identical 
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categories of employees are exempt from this requirement, 
including “any employee with respect to whom the Secretary 
of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and 
maximum hours of service” under 49 U.S.C. § 31502.  29 
U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).  There is no dispute that Plaintiff and his 
coworkers work for and Defendants are motor carriers subject 
to the Department of Transportation’s jurisdiction.  See 49 
U.S.C. § 13102(14).  The question here is whether 
Defendants are engaged in transportation between “a State 
and a place in another State.”  49 U.S.C. § 13501.  If so, then 
they are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions 
pursuant to the MCA.  See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).   
 
 FLSA exemptions must be construed narrowly against 
the employer, and Defendants “bear[] the burden of proving 
‘plainly and unmistakably’ that the drivers qualify for the 
MCA exemption.”  Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 
F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Friedrich v. U.S. 
Comput. Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Whether 
the exemption applies to a particular employer depends on 
“the class of the employer and the class of work the 
employees perform.”  Resch v. Krapf’s Coaches, Inc., 785 
F.3d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a)).  
The exemption applies if the employer “engage[s] in 
activities of a character directly affecting the safety of 
operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public 
highways of passengers or property in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”6  29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a).  When the transportation 
                                                                                                     
principles govern claims under FLSA and PMWA 
exemptions). 
6 The District Court held that because the water had 
economic value to Defendants, it could be sufficiently 
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takes place within a single state, the interstate commerce 
requirement may still be met by demonstrating that the 
employee’s work involves a “‘practical continuity of 
movement’ across State lines.”  29 C.F.R. § 782.7(b)(1) 
(quoting Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 
568 (1943)).7  Assessing whether “continuity of movement” 
exists focuses on the “essential character of the movement.”  
Packard, 418 F.3d at 255 (citing Balt. & Ohio Sw. R.R. Co. v. 
Settle, 260 U.S. 166, 170-73 (1922)).  For example, the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit examined whether the 
MCA exemption applied to a distributor who brought 
beverages into New York from out of state, then had its 
drivers deliver the beverages to customers solely within the 
state, and later collect empty bottles for return to the 
employer’s warehouse for recycling and shipment out of 
state.  Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distribs., Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 
219-20 (2d Cir. 2002).  The court held that the distributor’s 
drivers, who worked entirely within New York, were exempt 
from the FLSA’s overtime provisions because their “carriage 
was merely one leg of a route to an out-of-state destination,” 
and “part of a continuous movement of goods in interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 224. 
 
  Here, to demonstrate that their employees are engaged 
in interstate commerce under the MCA exemption, 
Defendants must similarly show that the drivers’ 
                                                                                                     
considered property for purposes of applying the exemption.  
Neither party challenges that ruling on appeal. 
7 These regulations are persuasive but not binding in 
determining the scope of the MCA exemption and definition 
of interstate commerce.  See Packard, 418 F.3d at 251-54 & 
nn. 5, 8. 
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transportation of water is part of a “continuous stream of 
interstate travel.”  Walters v. Am. Coach Lines of Miami, 
Inc., 575 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Chao v. 
First Class Coach Co., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d. 1263, 1272 
(M.D. Fla. 2001)).  Courts look to a number of factors to 
assess whether the employees and their activities are 
sufficiently involved in interstate commerce, including: (1) 
whether and to what extent a product pauses in a warehouse 
or other location during transport before reaching its final 
destination, Bilyou, 300 F.3d at 222-24; (2) whether the 
product is altered in any way during its transport, Collins v. 
Heritage Wine Cellars, Ltd., 589 F.3d 895, 898-99 (7th Cir. 
2009); (3) the employer’s intent concerning the delivery of 
the product at the time the transportation commences, see id.; 
and (4) whether the employer’s business “involve[s] an 
integrated system of interstate shipments.”  Packard, 418 F.3d 
at 255; compare id. (declining to apply the MCA exemption 
where handicap ride access drivers occasionally drove 
passengers to a bus or railroad station for interstate travel, but 
were not part of a regular stream of commerce), with Abel v. 
S. Shuttle Servs., Inc., 631 F.3d 1210, 1216-18 (11th Cir. 
2011) (per curiam) (applying MCA exemption to airport 
shuttle company because passenger reservations were often 
purchased as part of a package deal with airline tickets, 
creating a practical continuity of movement in interstate 
commerce).  While no single factor is required or controlling, 
a factor’s presence or absence may reveal the employer’s 
“fixed and persisting intent” at the time the shipment 
commenced, which is important to showing the existence of 
practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce.  
Foxworthy v. Hiland Dairy Co., 997 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 




 In this case, none of the three pieces of evidence 
Defendants produced demonstrate that their drivers were 
involved in a continuity of movement in interstate commerce.  
The DOT certificate merely authorizes Defendants to engage 
in interstate transportation.  It provides no information about 
whether Defendants’ drivers actually drove across state lines 
or otherwise engaged in interstate commerce.8  Similarly, the 
online news article Defendants provided offers, at best, 
general information that most fracking wastewater is trucked 
out of Pennsylvania to Ohio, but says nothing about any of 
the water Defendants’ employees transport.  Finally, the 
spreadsheet Defendants submitted shows, at most, that 
specific shipments of water are tracked and bound for specific 
interim destinations within Pennsylvania before being used in 
the fracking process.9  None of this evidence shows that the 
drivers or water were part of the practical continuity of 
movement in interstate commerce.10   
                                              
8 The certificate itself references only that the 
authorization will continue “as long as the carrier maintains 
compliance” with insurance coverage and process server 
designation requirements, as well as a requirement that the 
carrier “render reasonably continuous and adequate service to 
the public.”  App. II at 50.   
9 Defendants’ brief states that this spreadsheet reflects 
the care with which they account for the water transported, 
and they contend this supports a finding of “interstate intent.”  
Appellant’s Br. 12.  However, nothing in the spreadsheet 
provides a basis to infer Defendants intended to transport 
water recorded on the sheet out of state.  
10 The District Court noted the general insufficiency of 
the evidence Defendants presented, and apparently conducted 
its own research, concluding that the fact that water becomes 
10 
 
 Beyond this limited evidence, Defendants present only 
bare assertions, without evidentiary support in the record, 
about the fracking process and transportation in interstate 
commerce.  For instance, Defendants assert in their brief that 
water is sometimes picked up from sites in New York rather 
than Pennsylvania, and Defendants are sometimes contracted 
to haul wastewater to Ohio.  This assertion, however, is not 
backed up with evidence.  Moreover, even if the Defendants 
presented evidence supporting these assertions, it would not, 
by itself, demonstrate that their actions are a “clearly 
identifiable element of an integrated interstate distribution 
system.”  Packard, 418 F.3d at 254.  The mere fact that a 
journey which begins with Defendants transporting water 
from retention ponds and ends with water being driven from 
Pennsylvania into Ohio does not alone demonstrate 
Defendants were part of “an integrated system of interstate 
shipments” sufficient to satisfy Defendants’ burden.11  Id. at 
                                                                                                     
“contaminated,” App. I at 18, and “tainted” during the 
fracking process sufficiently changed the character of the 
water to demonstrate that “defendants’ trucking activities 
constitute two separate commercial transactions,” one 
involving delivery of the water, and the second picking up 
and transporting the water to Ohio, App. I at 20.  The 
evidentiary record provided by the parties lacks facts from 
which we can reach this conclusion, and we decline to look 
outside the record to address it.  See Fassett v. Delta Kappa 
Epsilon (N.Y.), 807 F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The 
only proper function of a court of appeals is to review the 
decision below on the basis of the record that was before the 
district court.”).   
11 Defendants argue that they meet this burden because 





 The details of a business’s operation are often critical 
to determining the connection between an employee’s actions 
and interstate commerce.  See, e.g., Morris v. McComb, 332 
U.S. 422, 431-33 (1947) (considering the proportion of a 
defendant’s interstate activities within its overall business 
operations and whether a plaintiff could be assigned to such 
activities).  As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
noted, minor differences in timing, title to the property being 
transported, and a predetermined destination for the items 
being transported can be dispositive of whether the MCA 
exemption applies.  Collins, 589 F.3d at 897-98 (noting that if 
an employer purchased wine from out of state, shipped the 
wine into the state, and used its truck drivers merely to 
transport wine, it would be subject to the exemption—but if 
the same importer shipped its wine to a wholesale distributor 
who took title over the product and used its own trucks for 
distribution, the shipments would be purely intrastate and not 
subject to the MCA).  Similarly, the relationship between 
Defendants, the fracking companies, and the movement of the 
                                                                                                     
transportation journey—is to transport the water to the 
disposal wells out of state.”  Appellant’s Br. 13 (emphasis 
omitted).  They, however, provide no evidence from which 
this intent can be gleaned.  Moreover, the mere intersection of 
a company’s activity and interstate commerce is not enough 
to warrant application of the MCA exemption.  See Packard, 
418 F.3d at 255 (“There is no general rule that once 
something . . . embarks on a journey that will eventually carry 
it between two states, every moment of that journey, through 
the last conceivable moment of travel, is necessarily interstate 
transport under the MCA.”).   
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wastewater out of state could theoretically be one involving a 
practical continuity of movement in interstate commerce, 
depending on, among other things, the intent of the shipper at 
the time shipment commenced, the role Defendants’ drivers 
played, whether the water is altered during the fracking 
process, and the steps for water removal and outgoing 
transportation.  Defendants, however, produced no evidence 
concerning these matters.   
 
 In short, Defendants have simply not met their burden 
to “plainly and unmistakably” show that the MCA exemption 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
